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DemirgLi,c-Kunt  investigates the relationship  equity to other individuals. Then the firm would
between stock market development and the  be able to also increase its borrowing. Also from
financing patterns of corporations in developing  the lending side, an active stock market would
countries. With an increasing number of stock  increase the debt of finns, allowing them to
markets emerging, the increased market activity  borrow more by improving the (uality  of infor-
could have an important impact on the capital  mation available to the banks.
structure of developing country corporations.
DemirgLic-Kunt  tests which of these sce-
Demirgfu,-Kunt poses the question: are debt  narios is more likely by analyzing the capital
and equity finance complements or substitutes?  structures of corporations for a sample of coun-
The answer also has a bearing on the banking  tries with stock markets at different stages of
systems in developing countries, as the bulk of  development. Although the data used in this
debt financing is provided through financial  study are limited and the results are preliminary,
intermediaries.  a positive and very significant correlation exists
between firm leverage and the extent of stock
Whether financing in developing countries  market development.
should be provided through caDital  markets or
financial intermediaries is the subject of research  This result supports the view that equity and
addressing the optimal structure of financial  debt finance are complementary. Thus, equity
contracts.  markets and financial markets are also comple-
mentary - so the existence of active stock
If debt and equity finance are substitutes, the  markets should increase the volume of business
cost of equity would decline with the emergence  for financial intermediaries.
of an active securities market, and banks would
face additional competition for their corporate  Further research is needed to determine if
customers. But debt and equity finance can also  these results hold for individual countries over
be complements since an equity market would  time.  Such research would use firn-level  data,
allow the owner of a closely-held company to  additional explanatory variables, and different
readily diversify risk by transferring some of the  definitions of leverage.
The  Policy  Research  Working  PaperSeriesdissemninates  thefindings  of work  under  way  in theBank.  Anobjectiveof  theseries
is to get these findings  out quickly,  even if presentations  are less than fully polished.  The findings,  interpretations,  and
conclusions  in these  papers  do not  necessarily  represent  official  Bank  policy.
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In the developing world financing patterns of enterprises vary greatly from what we
observe in developed countries.  In the poorest developing countries firs  rely on mostly internal
resources and informal credit markets for financing. Commercial banks are the main financial
institutions.  Their loan contracts are generally short-term and formal direct credit markets for
long term debt or equity do not exist.
Only as development proceeds further do the financial markets become more
sophisticated.  In the recent years stock markets started emerging in a number of developing
countries.'  Although it is widely known that an increase in the variety and magnitude of financial
institutions and services would improve the allocation of saving and investment, there is skepticism
about the role these emerging markets play in developing countries.  Often developing country
stock markets are criticized for being purely speculative. In other words, it is claimed that the
observed prices and their volatility cannot be explained by their underlying fundamentals, leading
to adverse real effects for capital formation and welfare. 2 It is also argued that market discipline
cannot be established in developing countries due to information disclosure problems,  costly
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, and lack of sufficient number of informed investors, all
of which exacerbate the usual asymmetric information and moral hazard problems. Another
criticism is directed towards the stock markets' potential for destabilizing developing countries'
financial system by allowing rapid inflows and outflows of capital, merely reflecting the
perceptions of international investors.
1  See IFC's Emerging Markets Data Base for a list of these countries.
2  There is an extensive literature on excess volatility in stock prices in developed countries.
See Dezhbakhsh and Demirguc-Kunt (1990) for references.3
However the proponents of stock markets emphasize the importance of having an active
stock market in enhancing the efficiency of investment. This is due to the control imposed on the
investment behavior of companies through continuous adjustment of their share prices.  In
addition, growth of stock markets is also expected to lead to a lower cost of equity capital and
hence stimulate investment and growth by spreading risks of long-term investment projects.
Finally,  stock markets can attract foreign portfolio capital and increase domestic resource
mobilization, expanding the resources available for investment in developing countries.
This paper seeks to investigate the impact of emerging stock markets on the financing
patterns of developing country corporations.  The focus is to test whether equity markets and
banking systems (which provide the bulk of the debt financing in developing countries) are
complements or substitutes in providing financing to corporations.  It is possible to answer this
question by investigating  capital structures of firms across a sample of countries with different
levels of stock market development.  If equity is substitute-  for debt financing one would expect
countries with less developed stock markets to have higher leverage.  However, if the opposite is
true and there is complementarity between equity markets and banks, leverage would increase as
stock markets become more developed.
Why should debt and equity financing be complements?  For a borrower to diversify
financing sources is important.  A closely-held, levered firm may not want to increase its
borrowing further even if it has expansion possibilities. However, an equity market would allow
the owner to readily diversify  risk by transferring some of the equity to other individuals. Then,
the firm would be able to also increase its borrowing. Also from the lending side, an active stock
market would increase the debt capacity of firms, allowing them to borrow more by improving the
quality of information available to the banks.  Although there is not a theoretical literature that4
formalizes these arguments in a model, empirical implication of complementarity would be a
positive correlation between leverage and the extent of development of stock markets.
However, debt and equity finance can also be substitutes.  A widely publicized, popular
reason for developing stock markets is the possibility  that an active securities market may result in
increased competition for the commercial banks in providing financing. Tne implicit assumption
underlying this statement is that debt and equity finance are substitutes.  Then as stock markets
develop, cost of equity decreases and corporations switch from debt to equity financing.
Therefore, if equity markets and banking systems are substitutes, empirically  there should be a
negative correlation between leverage and the extent of development of stock markets.
The World Bank and especially the International Finance Corporation are actively
supporting the emerging stock markets in developing countries.  Therefore it is important to
understand how the financing patterns of corporations in developing countries would be affected
with increased stock market activity. Especially the interactions between stock markets and
banking systems need further investigation to determine whether they would be competing or
actually complementing each other.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section discusses key properties of debt
and equity contracts in financing decisions. Section III reviews the literature on capital structure
to identify relevant factors, other than stock market development, that may affect the financing
pattern of corporations.  Section IV presents preliminary empirical findings and identifies
directions for further research.  Section V summarizes and concludes.5
IL  Debt versus Equity Contract
Individuals design financial relationships to minimize potential losses in the value of
investment due to existing informational and enforcement problems.  Different contracts and
financial structures emerge depending on the nature of these problems.  This section reviews
important properties of debt and equity contracts to highlight their differences.
One of the most important distinguishing  characteristics of the debt contract is that it
implies little risk sharing between lenders and the borrower, from an ex-ante point of view. 3
Under a debt contract the borrower commits to paying a fixed amount contingent on not
defaulting.  This makes the value of debt relatively insensitive to firm performance.  Ex-ante, debt
is a low-cost contract that allows a large degree of control by the borrower, and provides little
incentive to the lender for selecting and monitoring projects ultimately financed.  This property of
the debt contract allows debt to be priced more accurately than equity in situations involving
asymmetric information.  The equity contract on the other hand is much better  structured for risk-
sharing, ex-ante.  Equity can act as a cushion against unanticipated risks, since dividend payments
can be lowered or raised based on business conditions.
Bankruptcy is another characteristic of the debt contract.  Creditors act in a cohesive
manner, and under certain conditions debt can provide for a costly takeover of the firm. These
bankruptcy costs limit the amount of debt financing. The interdependence among capital
providers, however, is considerably different as they are stand alone obligations from both sides.
3  From an ex-post view point risk sharing with a debt contract is possible through
reschedulings.6
Finally, debt financing has benefits/costs that mitigateAvorsen  the conflicts of interest
between different parties.  These conflicts of interest, which are referred to as the agency costs
exist mainly due to two reasons: (i)  cash flow to equity is a convex function of returns to the
firm, leading the equity holders to take unnecessary risks; and (ii)  leverage increases manager's
equity ownership share, making the manager's payoff to be more sensitive to firm performance,
i.e., debt disciplines management.  The first one of these is referred to as the 'cost" of debt
financing whereas the second one is the "benefit." 4
In developing countries, government intervention in the financial system generally creates
a bias in favor of debt financing.  Especially interest subsidies of directed credit programs, ceilings
on interest rates, bailouts of troubled corporations keep cost of debt below its market level.  The
tax deductibility of interest expenses at the corporate level also reinforces this advantage.  The
importance of commercial bank debt also implies a concentration of risks within a small group of
financial institutions, which may pose a serious threat to the stability of the financial system.
Using the above properties of debt contract it is possible to build models explaining capital
structure decisions of firms. The next section reviews the literature on determinants of capital
structure.  A related literature is concerned with deriving debt as an optimal contract.'  These are
models of asymmetric information where investors are unable to observe income, a situation that
leads to moral hazard problems.  Under these circumstances debt emerges as an optimal contract
since the debt contract mitigates the incentive problem by making the borrower the residual
claimant for his investment.
4  Theories using agency cost approach to derive optimal capital structure are discussed in the
next section.
I  See Townsend (1979), Diamond (1984) and Hart and Moore (1989).7
However, as Gertler and Rose (1991) note, although 'it is necessary for the borrower to
bear (at least a large portion of) specific risks for incentive considerations, it is not clear why
the borrower should also bear general or systemic  risks.  They argue that if business cycle risks
affect the outcome of an investment, it is not optimal to punish the borrower since this condition
is obviously beyond his control.  Therefore, the optimal contract is a mixture of debt and equity,
where equity acts as a cushion against the business cycle.
Seward (1990) also examines the optimal structure of financial contracts in an economy
subject to moral hazard problems.  He shows that economic efficiencv is enhanced if the financial
structure of the economy consists of both direct and intermediated financial contract markets.  His
results demonstrate a motivation for the complementarity between capital markets and depository
financial institutions.
This paper examines whether debt and equity financing are complements or substitutes in
developing countries.  To answer this question the correlation between capital structures and the
extent of stock market development is analyzed for a cross-section of countries.  Other factors
that also need to be taken into consideration in this analysis  are identified based on the
theoretical literature on determinants of capital structure, reviewed in the next section.
III.  Determinants  of Capital Structure:  The Corporate  Financing Decision for a Firm
In the absence of bankruptcy costs, corporate income taxation, or other market
imperfections, Modigliani and Miller (1958) have shown that in competitive capital markets the
value of a firm is independent of its financial structure.  This argument is quite intuitive in that
since firm value depends on real asset value, purely financial transactions should not be expected
to change the overall value of the firm.  In other words, financial assets on the right hand side of8
the balance sheet have value only because of the real assets, including intangibles and growth
opportunities, on the left.  Therefore, if markets are doing their job, it should not be possible to
create value by shuffling the paper claims on the firm's real assets.
However, of course there could be an effect on firm value if there are market
imperfections. To name a few, if financial transactions are costly, if there is an effect on the
firm's tax liability, or if there are information asymmetries or agency costs, capital structurc would
matter.  Only if we leave all imperfections aside can we conclude that firm value should not
depend on capital structure.  Ironically,  the theory of capital structure starts with the Modigliani
and Miller paper, since by showing under what conditions capital structure is irrelevant they
actually identify directions for the development of such theories.
The literature on capital structure is vast.  The following  subsections review the more
recent literature and summarize its empirical implications. 6 The earliest issue discussed to justify
existence of optimal capital is taxes.  Besides tax issues, there are mainly four approaches used to
determine capital structure in the theoretical literature:  The agency-cost approach, the
asymmetric  information approach, the industrial organization approach, and the corporate
takeover approach.
Tax implications on oRtimal  capital
In the U.S. tax laws discriminate between debt and equity payments at the corporate level.
Interest payments are tax deductible while dividend payments to equity holders are not.  Tax laws
give debt a tax advantage assuming that personal income is tax exempt (Miller, 1977). However
6  This survey is not comprehensive but aims to highlight the most common approaches and
their general implications. For greater number of papers and more detailed information on
individual papers refer to Taggart (1985), Masulis (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1991).9
both dividend and interest payments are taxable at a personal level but capital gains tax can be
deferred.  Therefore, at a personal level equity income is taxed at a lower rate (due to this option
of deferred payment) than debt income.  If the investors of a firm are in the same marginal tax
bracket as the corporation, then the tax deductibility advantage of debt at the corporate level can
be exactly offset by its taxability disadvantage at the personal level, leaving the individual firms
indifferent (Miller, 1977).'  However, this equilibrium breaks down when there are other
imperfections in the market.
Agency-cost  approach to optimal capital
Agency costs refer to costs created due to conflicts of interest.  Jensen and Meckling
(1976) pioneered the work in developing models in which capital structure is determined by
agency costs.  Conflicts are possible between shareholders and managers, as well as between
shareholders and debtholders.
Conflicts between shareholders and managers arise because managers do not capture the
full return of their profit making activities.  Thus they may be able to transfer firm's resources to
themselves by indulging in personal benefits (corporate cars, jets, representation  allowances,
residences etc.) relative to the level that would maximize the firm value.  This tendency is reduced
the larger is the portion of the firm's equity owned by the manager.  Given the manager's level of
investment in the firm, increases in the firm's debt to equity ratio would increase the manager's
share of the equity, decreasing the inefficiencies resulting from the conflict of interest between
the manager and shareholders.  In addition, with more debt the firm commits to making larger
cash payments, decreasing the amount of idle or "free" cash available for wasteful expenditures by
Also see DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) and Modigliani (1982).10
the managers (Jensen,  1986).8  Thus, debt financing has the benefit of decreasing conflicts
between managers and shareholders.
Conflicts between shareholders and debtholders asise due to two main distortions: (i) the
underinvestment incentive and (ii) the risk shifting incentive. A levered firm would invest
suboptimally relative to an all-equity firm when the firm is managed in the best interest of
shareholders.  Ouce debt is issued investments are undertaken to maximize  equity value rather
than firm value, because the projects are evaluated on the basis of cash flows in non-bankrupt
states.  When firms are likely to go bankrupt in the near future, shareholders may have no
incentive to invest, even in value-increasing projects.  The reason is that shareholders bear the full
cost of investment, but the returns from the investment are mainly captured by the debtholders.
Thus, larger debt levels lead to the rejection of more value-increasing projects, i.e.,
underinvestment.  Another way of analyzing the situation is to model equity as a call option to
buy the firm at an excercise price equal to the debt obligation.  Thus debt distorts the risk-taking
incentives of shareholders since they can increase the value of their equity call option by
increasing the risk of the underlying assets of the firm. This happens since equityholders capture
most of the gain if an investment yields large returns above the face value of the debt.  However,
if the investment fails debtholders bear the consequences, due to limited liability. Therefore, a
levered firm will be run in an excessively  risky fashion, relative to an all equity firm. These excess
risks constitute the cost of debt financing.
Jensen and Meckling argue that an optimal capital structure is the result of a trade-off
between the benefit (discipline of management) and cost (excess risk-taking by shareholders) of
8  This is especially true for industries with large cash flows but without good investment
opportunities.  According to Jensen (1989) these are the characteristics of steel, chemicals,
brewing, tobacco, television and radio broadcasting, and wood and paper products industries
today.11
debt financing. There are a number of inmplications  of the Jensen-Meckling model.  First, bond
contracts are expected to include covenants to prevent excess risk taking by the shareholders.
Second, industries with limited opportunities for risk taking, i.e., regulated industries such as
public utilities and banks, are expected to have higher debt levels.  Third, firms for which slow or
even negative growth is optimal and firms that have large cash inflows from operations should
have more debt.
More recent models based on agency costs focus on the two conflicts identified by Jensen
and Meckling (1976) to derive an optimal capital structure.  In Harris and Raviv (1990) and Stulz
(1990) conflicts between managers and investors exist due to disagreements over an operating
decision.  Harris and Raviv assume that managers always  want to continue the firm's operations
even if liquidation of the firm is preferred by the investors (debtholders).  Stulz assumes managers
always want to invest all available funds even if paying  out cash is better for investors.  In either
case debt mitigates these problems.
In the Harris and Raviv model, debt gives its holders the option to force liquidation if
cash flows are poor.  The takeover of control by debtholders through bankruptcy entails
investigation costs to produce information (cost), yet this information is used to make an
improved liquidation decision (benefit).  Thus the optimal capital structure trades off  improved
liquidation decisions  versus higher investigation costs.  This model predicts that firms with higher
liquidation value, e.g., those with tangible assets, and with lower investigation costs will have more
debt and higher default probability. It also predicts that higher leverage can be expected to be
associated with larger firm value, higher debt level relative to expected income, and lower
probability of reorganization following default.
In Stulz, debt payments reduce free cash flow (as in Jensen, 1986). The cost of debt in
this model is that debt payments may end up being excessive in that they may exhaust more than12
the free cash, leading to a reduction in funds available for profitable investment.  Again, the
tradeoff between costs and benefits of debt leads to capital structure.  The model predicts that
firms with an abundance of good investment opportunities (growth firms) can be expected to have
low debt levels relative to firms in mature, slow-growth,  cash-rich industries.
Diamond (1989) and Hirshleifer and Thakor (1989) show how reputation considerations
may offset the incentive of levered equityholders to choose excessively  risky investments.  In
Diamond's model investors cannot distinguish between firms that make risky investments and
those that make safe investments ex ante.  Therefore, they charge an initial lending rate that
reflects their beliefs about the projects chosen by firms on average. 9 Only after firms build a
credit history, their lending rate is adjusted.  However, if the firm carn  convince its lenders it only
makes safe investments, it can enjoy a lower than average lending rate.  Since lenders can only
observe a firm's default history, it is possible for the firm to build a good reputation by not
defaulting." 0 The longer this history, the better  the reputation, and the lower the borrowing
costs.  Thus, the model predicts that older, more established firms find it optimal to choose safer
projects not to lose a hard-earned reputation.  Young firms with no reputation can take risks
initially, switching  to safer projects eventually, if they survive without default.  Therefore, well-
established firms have lower default rates and lower costs of debt than younger firms.  Although
debt level is fLxed  in Diamond's model, its extension yields the result that keeping everything else
constant, younger firms have less debt than older ones.
Hirshleifer and Thakor (1989) focus on the manager's reputation as an incentive to pursue
relatively safe projects.  Out of concern for his own reputation, a manager may prefer safer
4  The reason for this can be understood in the context of Akerlofs (1969) paper on "lemons"
problem.  Stiglitz and Weiss' (1981) credit rationing paper is also based on this lemons problem.
10 This point is also emphasized in Bernanke and Gertler (1987).13
projects to maximize probability of success, whereas shareholders would like to maximize the
value of their equity.  This behavior of managers reduces the agency cost of debt.  Thus the
model predicts that if managers value their reputation, the firm would be expected to have more
debt than otherwise.  Hirshleifer and Thakor argue that the value of reputation would be greater
for managers of firms that are more likely to be takeover targets.
Asymmetric information approach to optimal capital
In theories of capital structure that make use of asymmetric information as the driving
force, firm managers or insiders are assumed to possess private information about the firm's
expected return or investment opportunities.
Research initiated by Ross (1977) view the firm's capital structure choice as signalling
inside information to outside investors. In this model, the true distribution of firm returns is
known to the managers but not to the investors. Managers benefit if the firm's securities are
valued highly by the market but are penalized if the firm goes bankrupt.  High debt levels signal
good firm quality since only if the bankruptcy costs are low enough can the managers issue debt
and commit to high cash outflows (if the promised payments are not made managers suffer a
penalty).  Since lower quality firms have higher expected bankruptcy costs at any debt level,
managers of low quality firms cannot imitate higher quality firms  by issuing more debt.  Thus firm
value (or profitability) and the debt equity ratio are positively related.  Also increases in the
bankruptcy penalty, other things equal, decrease the debt level and the probability of
bankruptcy."
1' Also see Heinkel (1982), John (1987), and Piotevin (1989).14
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue capital structure is designed to offset inefficiencies in the
firm's investment decisions that are caused by information asymmetries. They show that if
investors are not as well informed as the insiders, then equity may be mispriced by the market.'
If firms are required to finance new projects by issuing equity, underpricing may be so severe that
new investors capture more than the net present value (NPV) of the new project, resulting in a
loss to the existing shareholders.  In this case positive NPV projects will  be rejected.  This
underinvestment problem is avoided if the firm can finance the new project by securities that are
not as severely undervalued by the mdrket.  Internal funds or riskless debt, that have no
undervaluation are preferred to equity.  Since even risky debt will have undervaluation to a lesser
degree, it is also preferred to equity.  This is Myers'(1984) "pecking order'  theory of financing
which states that capital structure is driven by firm's desire to finance new investments, first
internally, then with low-risk debt, and finally if all fails, with equity.  The most important
empirical implication of the theory is that announcement of an equity issue will lead to a decline
in the market value of firm's existing shares.  Another implication is that new projects will tend to
be financed mainly from internal sources or proceeds of low-risk debt issues. Finally, Myers and
Majluf (1984) implies that leverage increases with the extent of the informational asymmetry.
Brennan and Kraus (1987), Noe (1988), and Constantinides and Grundy (1989) criticize
the pecking order theory.  They show that firms do not necessarily have a preference for issuing
straight debt over equity if a richer set of financing options are available. In Brennan and Kraus
firms can avoid the underinvestment problem by signalling through issuing equity and using part
of the proceeds to repurchase debt simultaneously (whereas issuing equity only is a negative
12  Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss (1984) also discuss this issue, emphasizing the analogy
between "equity rationing" and credit rationing.
u  See Krasker (1986), Narayanan (1988), and Heinkel and Zechner (1990) for extensions.15
signal).  Thus in their model equity increasing exchanges can have a positive stock price reaction.
Noe and Constantinides and Grundy also show that allowing firms a wider range of financing
choices can invalidate Myers-Majluf results in some cases.  Constantinides and Grundy predict a
positive stock price reaction to debt increasing exchanges. Noe also shows that the average
quality of firms issuing debt is higher in equilibrium than that of firms issuing equity, predicting a
positive price effect of a debt issue.
Gertler and Rose (1991) also distinguish between internal (retained earnings) and external
(debt and new equity) funds.  In their model the borrower has to pay a premium for extemal
funds.  This wedge arises due to limited information and limited ability to enforce contracts.  The
magnitude of the premium depends inversely on the borrower net worth.  If the net worth is
sufficiently low the required premium for external finance may be prohibitive. They predict that
this premium would decline with the improved financial health of the borrowers, the development
of a liquid secondary market, improved auditing and enforcement technologies, the efficiency of
financial intermediation, and growth of the economy.
Another approach is to exploit managerial risk aversion to obtain a signalling equilibrium
in which capital structure is determined.  Increases in firm leverage leaves managers with a larger
fraction of equity.  Due to manager's risk aversion, a larger share of risky equity reduces
managerial welfare.  However, this decrease in welfare is greater for managers of lower quality
firms.  Thus managers of higher quality firms can signal their quality by having more debt in
equilibrium, which predicts a positive correlation between leverage and value keeping everything
else constant.  Leland and Pyle (1977) formalize this argument.
A related literature developed by Townsend (1979), Diamond (1984), and Gale and
Hellwig (1985), is concerned with deriving debt as an optimal contract.  In these models since
investors are unable to observe income (or at least a verification cost is paid to observe it),16
managers can appropriate any income not paid out to themselves. These models do not allow for
outside equity, default without liquidation, or the evolution of debt payments over time.
Extending Towsend's model, Chang (1987) allows investors to observe a noisy estimate of income,
which makes outside equity possible.  Within an agency model Chang obtains the result that firm
leverage and profitability are inversely correlated.  Finally, Hart and Moore (1989) provide a
dynamic model of debt in which they examine the implications of the ability of creditors to seize
assets when debtors default for the form of debt contract and the efficiency of debtor-creditor
relationship.
Industrial or*anization approach to optimal capital
Capital structure models based on product and input market interactions are relatively
recent.  One group of studies uses the relationship between a firm's capital structure and its
competition strategy in the product market to determine optimal capital.  These models assume
managers have incentives to maximize  equity value as opposed to profits or total value.  Leverage
changes the payoffs to equity inducing equityholders and managers, to pursue riskier strategies.
Oligopolists increase risk by a more aggressive  output policy. Therefore, choosing positive debt
levels is committing to pursue more aggressive  output policies (see for example Brander and
Lewis, 1986). These models show that oligopolists will tend to have more debt than monopolists
or firms in competitive industries.  Maksimovic  (1988) also shows that debt capacity increases with
the elasticity of demand and decreases with the discount rate.
A second group of studies focusses on the relationship between a firm's capital structure
and the characteristics of its product or inputs.  These models focus on the effect of capital
structure on the future availability  of products, parts and service, product quality, and the17
bargaining game between management and input suppliers.  Titman (1984) observes that
customers or suppliers of firms suffer liquidation costs such as inability to obtain the product,
parts or service.  Customers/producers transfer these costs to the stockholders of these firms in
the form of lower prices for the firm's output  Thus, it is optimal for stockholders to commit to
liquidate only in those states in which the net gains to liquidation exceed the costs imposed on
customers.  However, when the firm's debtholders make a liquidation decision they ignore these
costs.  Thus capital structure is arranged to ensure an optimal liquidation policy by mixing debt
and equity.  Since in bankruptcy states the stockholders never wish to liquidate and bondholders
always wish to liquidate, the optimal capital structure is one that would allow liquidation of the
firm only when net gain to liquidation exceeds the cost to customers.  It is shown that firms with
high liquidation costs to customers/producers, such as firms that produce unique products or
products that require service or parts (e.g., computer and automobile companies) and firms for
which a reputation for producing high quality products is important, will have less debt other
things kept constant (Maksimovic and Titman, forthcoming).
Corprate  takeover  approach  to optimal  capital
These models explore the linkage between the market for corporate control and capital
structure.  They focus on the fact that common stock carries voting rights while debt does not.
Harris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988) focus on the ability of a firm manager to manipulate the
probability of success of a takeover attempt by changing the fraction of the equity he owns.  In
the model there is an incumbent manager of a firm, a potential rival, and a large number of
passive investors.  Since the incumbent and the rival have different managerial talents, whether
the attempt succeeds or not affects the firm's value.  The manager's fraction of equity determines18
whether (i) he stays as manager, (ii) the rival takes over, or (iii) a decision is made by the rest of
the investors who always pick the best person for the job.  The incumbent manager determines his
optimal ownership share by trading off capital gains on his stake against the loss of personal
benefits Erom  being in control.  Since the firm's capital structure indirectly determines the
manager's share, this tradeoff also determines the optimal capital.  One implication of these
models is that on average takeover targets increase their debt levels and that the success of the
attempt is negatively related to leverage.  However these theories explain short-term changes in
capital rather than the long-term capital structure of firms.
Empirical implications of capital structure theories
Table 1 presents a summary of empirical implications of different capital structure theories
discussed above.  Since these theories are developed to model capital structure determinants in
developed countries, they are mostly silent as to how an emerging stock market would impact on
the financing pattern of corporations.  Corporate takeover approach to optimal capital structure
comes closest to exploring this relationship by predicting a higher leverage for corporations that
are takeover targets, since the more debt the corporation has, the less likely it is for a takeover
attempt to succeed.  However, in most developing countries emerging stock markets are far from
the stage where they would be able to establish a takeover discipline. Therefore, corporate
control theories do not predict much about the impact of an emerging stock market on financing
patterns of corporations in developing countries.
Nevertheless, capital structure theories determine the key factors that need to be
controlled in exploring the relationship between capital structure and stock market development.
Although not completely, the empirical analysis  of the next section includes some of these factors.19
In addition to stock market development, the empirical analysis incorporates effects related to
size, growth, profitability, change in profitability (as a proxy of risk), and stock market valuation of
firms.
IV.  Capital Structure  in Developing Countries
This section analyzes capital structure data for a sample of developing countries in the
light of the theoretical discussion above.  The data used are compiled by the IFC and obtained
from tables published in Singh et al. (1992).  The sample covers  Thailand, Korea, India, Turkey,
Pakistan, Mexico, Jordan, Zimbabwe, and Malaysia. Aggregate values are based on the top 50
manufacturing companies quoted on the stock market of each country.  Table 2 summarizes the
data for each country over the corresponding sample period.  Definitions of variables and a finer
breakdown of these values based on the size of the corporations are given in the appendix Tables
Al  and A2.
A cursory look at the data
The second column of Table 2, which reports the capital structure variable (long-term
debt to equity ratio), shows wide variations among countries.  Leverage varies from 8.7 percent
for Malaysia to 163.5 percent for Thailand.  The next three columns report the breakdown of
financing to internal and external (equity and debt) finance.  The results are surprising because
developing countries appear to be relying on external finance to a much greater extent than
developed countries.  In developed countries corporate growth is mostly financed internally20
through retained earnings, following  the pecking order theory of capital structure." 4 However,
according to the reported figures equity finance seems to play a very important role in developing
countries.  Especially in Turkey, Mexico, and Jordan, a median company appears to have financed
60, 76, and 84 percent of its growth from equity issues, respectively. However, these figures may
be misleading  due to the problems in distinguishing between internal and external equity.'
The rest of the variables in the table are the net asset growth, profitability as measured by
the ratio of before-tax earnings to net assets, change in profitability, price earnings ratio and
valuation ratio (Tobin's Q) as measures of stock market performance. The correlations between
these ratios and leverage are also of interest to investigate whether theories of capital structure
formulated for developed countries also hold for developing countries.
Table 3 reports data on developing country capital structures and emerging stock markets.
To characterize emerging stock markets, data on number of listed companies, total market
capitalization, trading value, and turnover ratio are used.  All these measures have shortcomings.
Number of listed companies or market capitalization do not indicate how developed, or at least
active the stock market is.  As in the case of many countries, companies may list their stock on
the exchange merely to benefit from the tax advantages provided. Trading value may be due to
continuous trading of only a small portion of the total listed stock in the exchange.  Also, trading
value is more relevant as a proportion of total market capitalization, which is given by the
turnover ratio.  In relative terms, turnover ratio provides the best statistic for ranking stock
markets in terms of exchange activity. Since more developed stock markets are usually the ones
14  See Taggart (1985) and Mayer (1989).
1  It may be the case that these companies have increased wealth internally during this period
by raising additional capital, but this is not equivalent to going to the equity market for new
issues. Therefore, these figures, at least for Turkey, do not represent external equity in the true
sense.21
with greater exchange activity, the analysis here assumes that stock markets with higher turnover
ratio are the relatively more developed ones.
From Table 3 an interesting pattern emerges.  It appears that countries with more active
stock markets have greater leverage. This observation is consistent with the complementarity of
stock markets and banking systems. From the borrower's point of view, a closely-held  levered
firm with expansion possibilities may not want to increase its leverage further due to costs of debt
financing mentioned in section III.  However, the existence of an active stock market would allow
the firm to diversify  its financing. Once additional equity is issued, or a portion of existing equity
is publicly owned, the firm having diversified its financing, would be able to increase its leverage
further.  From the lender's point of view, the amount of reliable information on corporations also
increases with an active stock market, allowing the banks to make better credit assessments,
possibly  increasing the borrowing ability of listed companies.  Both effects would indicate a
positive correlation between leverage and development of stock markets.  However, it is
important to check whether this simple correlation reported in Table 3 holds up in a multivariate
analysis  once other relevant characteristics identified by the theory are controlled for.
Empirical evidence
The purpose of this section is to further analyze the correlation between stock market
development and aggragate leverage, holding other relevant factors constant as much as possible
with the available data.  To do this, leverage regressions including stock market characteristics and
other explanatory variables are estimated.  In estimating leverage regressions the purpose is not to
specify causality, but rather to observe correlations between leverage and included variables.22
These results are at best very preliminary considering the sample size and the aggragate nature of
the data.  The data set used is given in the appendix, Table A2.
Table 4 reports simple correlations between stock market characteristics.  All three
variables, trading value, market capitalization, and turnover ratio are very highly correlated.  The
results of the leverage regressions are reported in Table 5.  Besides stock market characteristics
these regressions include a size dummy ranging from 1 to 4, representing 4 quartiles of firms in
each country classified based on their asset sizes.  For each size group, median values of net asset
growth, profitability, and  price earnings ratio are also included.  The resulting sample consists of
these variables for four size groups for each country. All values are medians averaged over the
corresponding time period for each country's size group.
Four specifications of leverage equation are estimated.  The first three specifications
include stock market characteristics, and the last one only includes firm characteristics. Stock
market variables are entered  separately due to the high correlation among them.  All three
characteristics develop very significant and positive coefficients.  The specification without stock
market variables has an R2 of 45 percent.  However the statistical fit of the regression improves
substantially  with the introduction of stock market variables.  The preferred specification which
includes the turnover ratio, the best proxy capturing the extent of stock market development, has
an R 2 of 80 percent.  Trading value and market capitalization variables also improve the fit of the
regression but not to the extent of the turnover ratio.
Income per capita is also included in the regressions to test whether the significant
coefficients of stock market variables are merely reflecting the existence of different income level
countries in the sample.  However, holding income constant does not change the results
significantly. In fact, the variable develops a negative and insignificant  coefficient in three out of23
four specifications.  Finally, deflating the trading value and market capitalization by income to
account for the size of the economy does not improve the results.  These results are not reported.
These preliminary results indicate that debt and equity finance are complements.  In other
words, as discussed above, the existence of an active stock market also increases the debt capacity
of firms.  This result is also consistent with the observation that leverage ratios of developed
countries are generally much higher that those of the developing countries.  Then, as stock
markets develop, leverage ratios in developing countries can be expected to go up.
Although the paper focuses on the relationship between corporate financing structure and
development of stock markets, the coefficients of the control variables are also reported for
completeness.  Consistent with the empirical findings in developed countries, the coefficient of
the size dummy is positive in three specifications although it is insignificant. A positive sign
indicates that larger firms are more leveraged.  Usually this difference of leverage between small
and large companies is explained by differential access to debt financing." 6 Smaller firms
represent a higher credit risk and smaller loans are more costly to monitor.  Also to the extent
smaller firms are also younger, less established ones, a positive sign for the size variable is
consistent with the prediction of the agency cost theories.
The coefficient of net asset growth variable, which is expected to proxy growth
opportunities available to the firm, gives mixed results.  In the preferred specification the sign is
negative and significant  which is consistent with the implication of capital structure theories that
predict mature, low-growth industries to have higher leverage and firms with good investment
opportunities to have lower leverage.  A negative sign indicates that an increase in growth
opportunities decreases leverage.
16 The smallest firms may not have any access to equity markets.  However, here the sample
consists of listed firms, and "small"  is used in a relative sense.24
The profitability measure develops mixed results and is not significant except in one
specification.  The, theory is also conflicted on the issue of correlation between firm profitability
and leverage, although majority of the theories predict a positive correlation (see Table  1).
Price earnings ratio produces negative and significant coefficients.  This variable is
included as a measure of stock market valuation.  Replacing this ratio with the valuation ratio
results in positive and significant  coefficients.  This result is more consistent with theory, which
predicts a positive correlation between stock market valuation and leverage.  With this
specification the coefficient of turnover ratio remains positive and very significant although
trading value and market capitalization develop positive yet insignificant  coefficients.  These
results are not reported.
These variables do not control for all relevant factors completely.  However, due to data
limitations, other proxies are not included.  In addition, averaging data over the sample period
and taking the median values may be blurring the results.  It would be interesting to analyze firm
level data and include additional control variables.  The preliminary results of this paper indicate
positive correlation between leverage and stock market development across countries.  Time
series data on each country can be analyzed to investigate whether this correlation holds for
individual countries through time, as their stock markets develop.  Also, regulatory restrictions
and different types of banking systems (universal vs. other) should be controlled for in explaining
cross country differences in leverage.  Finally, leverage in this analysis  only includes long term
debt.  It would be interesting to analyze changes in the short term debt to equity ratio as well.
These extensions are left for future research.25
V.  Conclusions
This paper investigates the relationship between stock market development and financing
pattern of corporations in developing countries.  With an increasing number of emerging stock
markets the possible impact of increased market activity on the capital structure of developing
country corporations gains importance.  The question posed is whether debt and equity finance
are complements or substitutes.  The answer to this question also has bearing upon the banking
systems in developing countries since the bulk of debt financing is provided through financial
intermediaries. Whether financing in developing countries should be provided through capital
markets or financial intermediaries is the subject of research addressing optimal structure of
financial contracts.
If debt and equity finance are substitutes, then with the emergence of an active securities
market cost of equity would decline and banks would face additional competition for their
corporate customers.  However, if debt and equity finance are complements, borrowing capacity
of firms increase with the availability  of equity financing, and given the improved quality of
information provided by stock markets banks may be able to assess creditworthiness more
accurately, increasing their lending.
This paper tests which one of these scenarios is more likely by analyzing capital structures
of corporations for a sample of countries with stock markets at different stages of development.
Although the data used in this study are limited and the results are preliminary, a positive and
very significant  correlation exists between firm leverage and extent of stock market development.
This result supports the view that equity and debt finance are complementary. Thus,
equity markets and financial intermediaries are also complementary, with existence of active stock
markets resulting in an increased volume of business for tne financial intermediaries.26
Further research is necessary to determiine if these results would hold for individual countries
through time, employing additional explanatory variables and different definitions of leverage and
using firm level data.27
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Table 1. Empirical Implications of Capital Structure Theories
nTeoretical Paper  I  Empirical Implication on Leverage
Tax Implications  __
Modigliani and Miller (1958)  Leverage increases with interest tax shields.
Miller (1977)  Leverage not affected by interest tax shields
if the tax deductibility advantage at the
corporate level is exactly offset at the
l  _____________________________________  personal  level.
Agency Cost Theories
Jensen and Meckling (1976)  Leverage increases with the extent of
regulation.  Mature, low-growth, cash-rich
industries have higher leverage.
Jensen (1986)  Leverage increases with large cash flows,
Stultz (1990)  and lack of good investment opportunities.
Harris and Raviv (1990)  Leverage increases with:




higher debt to expected income ratio,
higher probability of liquidation after default
higher default probability.
Diamond (1989)  Leverage is higher the more established the
firm is.  Younger firms have less debt.
Hirshleifer and Thakor (1989)  Leverage is higher the more the managers
care about their reputation.  This is more
likely if the firm is a takeover target.
Asymmetric Information Theories
Ross (1977)  Leverage increases with firm value and
profitability, and it decreases with an increase
in bankruptcy penalty.
Myers and Majluf (1984)  Leverage increases with the extent of
informational asymmetry. New investments
will be financed first internally, then with
low-risk debt, and finally  with equity.
Leland and Pyle (1977)  verage increases with firm value.32
Table 1 (Cont.).  Empirical  Implications of Capital Structure Theories
Theoretical Paper  I  Empirical Implication on Leverage
Asymmetric Information Theories
Chang (1987)  I  Lev.erage  decreases with profitability.
Industrial Organization Theories
Brander and Lewis (1986)  Leverage depends on market structure.
Oligopolists have more debt than monopolists
or firms in competitive industries.
Maximovic (1988)  Debt capacity increases with the elasticity of
demand and decreases with the discount rate.
Titman (1984)  Leverage is higher the lower the liquidation
Maximovic and Titman (forthcoming)  cost is to customers/producers.  Leverage is
lower the more unique the firm's product is,
and the more the firm cares about its
________________________________reputation  of  producing  high  quality  products.
Corporate Takeover Theories
Harris and Raviv (1988)  Leverage is higher if the firm is a takeover
Stultz (1988)  target, in which case the success of the
takeover attempt becomes less likely.
Note:  The implied correlation between leverage and the above factors does not necessarily
indicate causality.33
Table 2. Capital Structure  Across Developing  Countries for Top 50 Listed Companies in
Manufacturing
(in percent)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)
Cntry  LTD/E  Internal  Equity  Debt  Net  Profita-  Change  P/E  MV




land  163.5  17.3  NA  NA  7.5  5.7  3.6  12.3  2.14
83-87  . . ..... 
Korea  116.7  12.8  40.3  45.4  15.7  5.5  3.1  8.1  0.59
80-87  _  . _  . . .
India  46.1  36.1  11.0  45.6  23.5  11.8  -13.5  10.5  1.62
80-88  I  _.  ..  ____
Turkey  26.6  18.1  60.5  15.5  44.7  34.7  5.4  9.9  2.80
82-87  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Pakis-
tan  24.5  58.3  12.3  16.1  13.8  20.1  -5.2  5.9  NA
80-86  __  _  _
Mexico  12.5  17.1  76.0  2.9  81.4  11.3  7.5  NA  NA
84-88  _
Jordan  12.3  5.8  84.1  16.4  7.8  7.8  -2.8  15.4  1.04
80-87  . ..  _  . . _.  _  ___
Zirn-
babwe  9.7  58.5  43.0  0.0  13.8  16.9  -2.1  3.7  0.49
80-87
Malay-
sia  8.7  42.4  31.4  2.1  4.3  8.6  -2.8  29.1  1.65
83-87  ____
Notes:  These are the median values averaged over the sample period.  Number of companies in
Jordan is 35 and Turkey is 38.  For Thailand earnings after tax are used in calculating profitability.
Variable definitions are given in the appendix, Table Al.  The source of the data is the
Economics Department of International Finance Corporation, published in Singh et al. (1992).34
Table 3.  Capital Structure  In Developing Countries and Emerging Stock Markets.
Country  LTD/E  Number  of  Market  Trading  Turnover
(in %)  Listed Co.  Capitalization  Value (in  Ratio (in %)
(in mil. of  mil. of US $)
Thailand  163.5  214  23,896  4,334  18.5
Korea  116.7  669  110,594  22,664  22.2
India  46.1  2435  38,567  5,680  12.6
Turkey  26.6  100  19,065  1,531  6.7
Pakistan  24.5  487  2,850  58  2.0
Mexico  12.5  199  32,725  2,705  8.9
Jordan  12.3  105  2,001  37  1.8
Zimbabwe  9.7  57  2,395  15  0.7
Malaysia  8.7  282  48,611  1,798  4.1
Notes:  Variable definitions are given in the appendix, Table Al.  The leverage data are obtained
from the  Economics Department of International Finance Corporation, as published in Singh et
al. (1992).  Emerging stock market data are obtained from IFC's Emerging Markets Data Base
and are as of 1990, Quarter IV.35
Table 4.  Stock Market Characteristics  - Simple Correlations
Trading Value  |_Turnover  Ratio
Market Capitalization  0.931**  0.756**
Turover  Ratio  0.821  -I
**  indicates significant  correlation at the one percent significance level.  Variable defnitions  are
given in the appendix, Table Al.36
Table S. Leverage  Regressions  and Capital Market Characteristics:
Relative Explanatory  Powers of Turnover  Ratio, Trading Value, and Market
Capitalization.
RHS variables  Alternative  Specifications
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
constant  -11.04  24.57  -43.13  103.78**
(26.26)  (35.97)  (75.87)  (33.04)
size dummy  2.91  -1.49  0.38  3.91
(4.70)  (6.67)  (7.43)  (7.70)
net asset growth  -2.09*  -0.81  0.87  3.22**
(1.03)  (1.49)  (1.52)  (1.10)
profitability  2.10  -1.56  -3.62  -6.38**
EBT/NA  (1.52)  (1.83)  (1.87)  (1.48)
P/E  -0.22  -2.60**  -2.61**  -1.76#
(0.60)  (0.81)  (0.95)  (0.91)
Turnover ratio  7.64**
(6.82)  l




Summary  statstics 
no. of obs.  32  32  32  32
R 2 .80  .62  .53  .45
Notes:  The dependent variable is leverage (LTD/E).  Standard errors are given in parantheses.
Superscripts **, *, #  indicate significance levels at one, five and ten percents respectively.
The sample includes Thailand, Korea, India, Turkey, Pakistan, Jordan, Zimbabwe, and
Malaysia. For each country, time series averages for four size groups are included.  Variable
definitions and data are given in the appendix, Tables Al  and A2.37
APPENDIX
Table Al.  Variable  Definitions and Sources.
LDT/E  Leverage, the firm's long term debt to equity ratio.
Internal Finance  The proportion of the firm's growth of net assets  which has been
financed by retained earnings.
External Finance  The proportion of the firm's growth of net assets which has been
(equity)  financed by new equity issues.
External Finance  The proportion of the firn's  growth of net assets which has been
(long term debt)  financed by long-term debt.
Growth  Growth rate of net assets.
Profitability  Earnings before tax to net asset ratio. This is the pre-tax rate of return
EBT/NA  on net assets.
Change in  Change in pre-tax rate of return on net assets measured from the
Profitability  beginning of the 1980s  to the end of the 1980s.
P/E  Price-Eamings ratio calculated using year-end share prices.
MV/BV  The valuation ratio, or Tobin's Q, which expresses the stock market
valuation of the firm's equity as a proportion of the book value of its
assets.
Size  A dummy variable that takes the value 1 to 4, grouping firms in each
country into four quartiles based on their size.  Firms in the fourth
quartile are the largeSt.
Market  Market value of all listed companies. The market value of a company is
Capitalization  the share price times the number of shares outstanding.
Trading Value  Total value of shares traded during the period.
Turnover Ratio  Trading value to market capitalization ratio.
Notes:  All firm data are from Singh et al. (1992) and are compiled by the Economics Department
of International Finance Corporation.  For detailed definitions of the variables and their
limitations see Singh et al. (1992).  Emerging stock market data are obtained from IFC's
Emerging Markets Data Base.38
Table A2.  Data on Top 50 Listed Companies Pi Manufacturing:  Median Values for Each
Indicator for Quartiles of Firms Classified By Opening Size.
- ,._  _ ..  -
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)
Finance  Asset  bility  in (7)  BV
Growth  EBT/
_  _  _  _  _  NA_  _  _
|Tailand  (1983-1987) 
Q1  148.3  16.1  NA  NA  14.5  5.8  2.4  14.2  2.1
Q2  170.5  26.9  NA  NA  16.5  6.7  2.4  13.2  1.8
Q3  150.5  32.0  NA  NA  4.4  6.8  6.5  9.5  2.5 ;~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--  --  .1.  2.7  ... 
Q4  216.0  11.4  NA  NA  4.0  4.6  3.5  12.7  2.7
Korea (1980-1987)
Q1  J  104.8  19.2  32.2  49.2  21.8  9.9  1.3  7.4  0.72
Q2  95.0  17.3  42.1  30.8  17.0  6.2  1.5  6.4  0.58
Q3  124.2  12.0  41.0  47.7  13.0  4.3  2.8  8.8  0.59
Q4  144.1  9.8  41.3  45.4  14.5  5.1  4.2  9.4  0.62
India (1980-1988)
Q1  I44.8  49.2  9.9  35.4  27.4  20.2  -20.4  8.5  1.46
Q2  47.7  32.0  17.8  50.0  23.2  11.3  -13.6  10.9  1.58
Q3  46.5  36.1  9.3  50.7  21.1  11.6  -9.1  9.4  1.44
Q4  56.1  30.9  11.8  45.8  18.9  8.3  -6.4  11.5  1.49
Turkey (1982-1987)
Q1  17.5  18.5  60.7  14.3  54.0  44.9  -14.1  10.0  3.05
Q2  46.0  17.5  61.3  24.1  44.6  33.7  11.9  9.9  2.60
03  |  24.7  18.9  60.3  14.4  44.8  36.4  6.8  9.5  3.40
04  37.1  24.5  54.7  14.9  40.5  25.1  20.3  7.9  2.6039
Table A2.  Data on Top 50 Listed Companies in Manufacturing: Median Values for Each
Indicator  for Quartiles  of Firns  Clas, lfed  By Opening Size  Continued.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)
Size  LTD/E  Internal  Equity  Debt  Net  Profita-  Change  P/E  MV!
Finance  Asset  bility  in (7)  BV
Growth  EBT/
t~~_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  ,  . _  _  _  _  _  N  A  . _  _  _11
Pakistan  (1980-1986)  .
Q1  38.1  49.6  7.8  43.6  22.8  24.6  -14.4  3.0  NA
Q2  15.1  60.5  16.6  19.7  15.8  21.5  -10.9  6.1  NA
Q3  18.6  72.3  14.1  4.0  9.9  1&5  -5.7  7.4  NA
04  25.9  61.1  7.6  13.9  8.4  18.2  2.5  5.1  NA
Mexico  (1984-1988)
Q1  12.2  26.1  67.0  0.0  84.5  21.3  6.4  NA  NA
Q2  9.0  17.7  81.0  3.2  77.6  14.6  10.3  NA  NA
Q3  11.1  15.4  77.5  4.6  68.4  9.5  2.3  NA  NA
Q4  14.1  16.1  76.3  4.0  80.5  10.8  8.5  NA  NA
Jordan  (1980-1987)
Q1  7.2  60.2  12.2  27.6  10.9  11.5  -11.2  15.8  1.03
Q2  9.4  3.7  95.1  9.9  8.7  6.5  5.3  19.1  1.17
Q3  11.0  -48.5  85.1  0.0  5.0  10.2  1.8  11.6  0.96
Q4  1  32.2  40.3  23.3  36.4  2.4  7.4  -13.4  15.4  1.22
Zimbabwe  (1980-1987)
Q1  6.2  63.5  27.5  0.0  15.6  17.9  -8.1  3.7  0.50
Q2  14.2  65.4  20.2  0.0  14.2  21.0  -5.3  3.8  0.55
Q3  6.1  53.5  46.3  0.0  13.7  14.1  -1.8  4.3  0.43
Q4  26.5  48.3  43.5  4.3  7.6  15.0  9.6  3.1  0.3840
Table A2. Data on Top 50 Listed Companies in Manufacturing: Median Values for Each
Indicator  for Quartiles  of Firms Classified By Opening Size - Continued.
-2  _____=__:_________====  =Y  =  .-  .
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)
Size  LTD/E  Internal  Equity  Debt  Net  Profita-  Change  P/E  MV/




Q1  18.2  26.1  55.6  32.9  9.2  5.1  -2.2  49.7  2.17
Q2  4.1  38.4  58.6  3.1  5.3  85  -3.0  31.4  1.76
Q3  7.9  66.0  0.1  0.0  3.3  8.7  -2.6  26.7  1.53
0 Q4  17.2  46.4  26.1  13.1  3.1  10.7  -7.0  28.4  2.16
==  =  =  *  __  .
Notes: 'These are the median values averaged over the sample period for firms in each quartile.
Number of companies in Jordan is 35 and Turkey is 38.  For Thailand earnings after tax are used
in calculating profitability. Variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix, Table Al.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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